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Y EL ARGUMENTO DE PUTNAM BASADO EN 
LA TEORÍA DE LOS MODELOS 
Resumen: A partir de 1976, en muchas ocasiones Hilary Putnam ha pro-
puesto un argumento, fundado en algunos resultados de la teoría de mode-
los, según el cual cualquier programa filosófico, cuyo propósito sea natura-
lizar la semántica, fracasó en dar cuenta de un importante rasgo de todo 
lenguaje natural: la determinación de la referencia.  Aquí, después de 
haber presentado el argumento, sugiero que no funciona, porque simple-
mente asume lo que debería probar, esto es, que no debemos extender la 
metateoría: al parecer Putnam piensa que todo lo que podemos asertiva-
mente afirmar acerca de las relaciones entre las palabras y las entidades en 
el mundo es lo que la teoría de modelos nos dice, pero nunca ha aportado 
justificaciones para ello. Al final del articulo, discutiré la aparentemente 
confiable intuición que me parece yace en la raíz del argumento, esto es, 
que dada una teoría muy formal, hay un infinito número de modos de 
conectarla con o proyectarla sobre el mundo. Sugeriré que deberíamos 
resistir tal intuición, porque descansa sobre una muy dudosa noción del 
mundo, la cual asume que para cualquier clase de objetos hay una propie-
dad correspondiente.  
 
Palabras clave: Indeterminación de la referencia, naturalización de la se-
mántica, metateoría. 
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NATURALIZING SEMANTICS AND  
PUTNAM’S MODEL–THEORETIC  
ARGUMENT∗ 
Abstract: Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has on many occasions proposed an 
argument, founded on some model–theoretic results, to the effect that any 
philosophical programme whose purpose is to naturalize semantics would 
fail to account for an important feature of every natural language, the 
determinacy of reference. Here, after having presented the argument, I will 
suggest that it does not work, because it simply assumes what it should 
prove, that is that we cannot extend the metatheory: Putnam appears to 
think that all we may determinately say about the relations between words 
and entities in the world is what the model theory tells us, but he has never 
offered justifications for that. At the end of the article, I will discuss the 
apparently reliable intuition that seems to me to be at the root of the argu-
ment, that is that, given a formal theory, there is an infinite number of 
ways of connecting it to, or of projecting it onto, the world. I will suggest 
that we should resist this intuition, because it rests on a very doubtful no-
tion of world, which assumes that for any class of objects there is a corre-
sponding property. 
 
Key words: Indeterminacy of reference, naturalization of semantics, 
metatheory. 
 
Are what we usually call “natural languages” really 
natural? Put like this, the question is quite vague (what ex-
actly counts as natural?). One discussed way of specifying it is 
more or less the following. Let us assume that physics is the 
basic science, the one to which all the other natural sciences 
could in some way be traced back. Does it have at its disposal, 
at least in principle, the conceptual resources to account for 
all interesting properties of a language? That is: will the final 
physical theory, supposing we reach it, explain every linguis-
tic phenomenon, alongside the chemical, or biological, or 
meteorological ones? As often happens in philosophy, some 
                                                 
∗ The first time I presented the ideas of this work was at the Seminar on Ana-
lytic Philosophy at the University of Padua. I am grateful to all the partici-
pants. I would also like to thank Pierdaniele Giaretta, Paolo Leonardi, Enrico 
Martino and Ernesto Napoli for their comments on earlier written versions. 
NATURALIZING SEMANTICS AND PUTNAM’S ...  
 
 
3
think so, others do not. Notoriously, the greatest difficulties 
are represented by semantic phenomena, because of their 
intentional and normative aspects. If nonetheless we opted for 
an affirmative answer and turned into the uncertain road of 
naturalization, we would very soon come across a fork with 
regard to the traditional semantic notions (especially refer-
ence and truth): should we eliminate, perhaps substituting 
them with surrogates, or reduce them? The latter possibility 
could gain substance more or less in this way: firstly, we 
show how the semantic properties of complex expressions of 
any language are determined by their structure and the se-
mantic properties of their constituents; secondly, we try to 
identify the primitive expressions and a natural relation, in 
the sense specified, which holds between each of them and its 
semantic value (which, in order to avoid circularity, has to be 
an entity accessible by non linguistic means).1 Obviously, on 
these bases we can articulate very different programmes, 
depending on the chosen natural relation and on the isolated 
class of primitive expressions. This second aspect has some 
consequences on the problems we then have to face: the 
wider the class, for example up to the inclusion of all or al-
most all the syntactically simple expressions (roughly, the 
words), the more difficult to find a natural relation, non lin-
guistically mediated, that each of them would have with its 
                                                 
1 The first clear formulation of this two–stage strategy was in Field, H., “Tarski’s 
Theory of Truth”, Journal of Philosophy, 69 (1972), pp. 347–75, reprinted in 
id., Truth and the Absence of Fact, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 2001, pp. 3–26. 
As for the first stage, he wrote that Tarskian semantics, correctly understood, 
“explains the semantic properties of complex expressions (e.g., truth value for 
sentences, denotation for complex singular terms) in terms of semantic prop-
erties of their primitive components” (p. 6), that is to say it reduces truth and 
denotation to “primitive denotation”. Furthermore, he showed that also truth 
conditions (for sentences, functions from worlds to truth values) can be ex-
plained in the same way, if we take it that a primitive predicate “stands not 
for a set (its extension) but for a property that exists in the actual world” (id., 
“Mental Representation”, Erkenntnis, 13 (1978), pp. 9–61, reprinted in id., 
Truth and the Absence of Fact, cit., pp. 30–67, p.41). As for the second stage, 
he suggested a causal theory of primitive denotation, but without working it 
out. Just a remark on terminology: hereafter I will use “reference” for the se-
mantic value of primitive expressions (Field’s “primitive denotation”). 
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reference; viceversa, the narrower the class, the more worry-
ing Quine’s criticisms of the analytic\synthetic distinction.2 
All research programmes that have so far moved in this 
direction have got no further than an embryonic stage, and it 
is more than legitimate to have doubts and perplexities about 
their chances of success.3 Here, however, we will suppose 
that any one of them has reached its goal, having succeeded 
on the one hand in indivituating a naturalistically sound 
predicate that turns out to be equiextensional to “refer to” 
when we narrow down to the selected primitives the set on 
which the latter is defined, on the other in finding the way of 
specifying, avoiding Quinean criticisms, how non primitives 
inherit their semantic properties. The question we should 
discuss is: in this case would naturalization of language have 
really been achieved? 
Since 1976 Hilary Putnam has on many occasions pro-
posed an argument to the effect that the programme in ques-
tion would anyway have missed the mark.4 In this article, my 
purpose is to discuss and criticize the argument. In the next 
section, I will present a reconstruction of it. In the following 
one, I will show where and why in my opinion it does not 
                                                 
2 The first line is Jerry Fodor’s (see Fodor, J.A., Concepts: Where Cognitive 
Science Went Wrong, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998). The second has a 
longer tradition, at the beginning outside the naturalistic framework, starting 
with Russell’s logical atomism and continued by logical positivists, especially 
Rudolf Carnap. Among naturalists, it is defended by upholders of inferential 
role semantics. Against them, Fodor reproposed Quine’s criticisms to the Car-
napian project (See Fodor, Concepts, cit., ch. 4). 
3 For a brief critical discussion of them, see Loewer, B., “A Guide to Naturalizing 
Semantics” in Hale, B. and Wright, C. (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy 
of Language, London, Blackwell, 1997, pp. 108–26. 
4 The first formulation of the argument was in a 1976 conference, “Realism 
and Reason”, published as the fourth part in Putnam, H., Meaning and the 
Moral Sciences, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978, where it was ac-
knowledged as a “turn” in his thinking (p. 5). Other, more articulated, ver-
sions are in “Models and Reality” (1977), which became the first chapter of 
id., Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, Cambridge (Mass.), 
Cambridge University Press, 1983, and in id., Reason, Truth and History, 
Cambridge (Mass.), Cambridge University Press, 1981, ch. 2. The introduc-
tion to the 1983 book (pp. vii–xviii) offers a non technical but clear concise 
exposition of the argument (inclusive of a “parable”, pp. ix–x), and an effec-
tive placement of it in the historical context. 
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work, and that will lead me to make some general considera-
tions on the relations between model theory and naturalized 
semantics. To conclude, I will clarify what seems to me to be 
the alleged intuition that grounds the argument and I will try 
to explain why I do not find it convincing. 
Putnam’s argument 
We all agree, I think, that the words we use when we 
speak have a univocal and determined reference (apart from 
the ambiguity of some expressions, and perhaps the vague-
ness of some others): “Aristotle” refers to Aristotle, not to 
Kant; “cat” to cats, not to dogs (or: to cathood, not to dog-
hood). Things being so, a good theory of language, whether 
naturalistic or not, should account for it: the reference of the 
expressions should turn out in some way determined. Unfor-
tunately, according to Putnam, this would not happen with 
the conceptions of language which move along the lines we 
have sketched above, which would therefore show them-
selves to be inadequate.5 
Reconstructing Putnam’s argument in detail is not easy, 
for a number of reasons. First of all, he has proposed versions 
quite unlike each other, and not always compatible, as vari-
ous commentators have noted.6 Moreover, he makes use in 
turn of two different, though related, aspects of the classical 
metatheory: on the one hand, the Löwenheim–Skolem theo-
rem (with connected Skolem ‘paradox’), on the other, the 
                                                 
5 Putnam thinks that the only way of saving the determinacy of reference is to 
adopt the perspective of the internal realism, which ceases to consider the re-
lation of reference as the naturalist being discussed does, namely as a relation 
which the expressions would bear to objects in a world that is independent 
from our representations. Instead, the latter would always be the objects of a 
theory, and that would make the determinacy of reference almost tautologi-
cal. Here I am not going to discuss Putnam’s proposal, which I find difficult to 
understand. Instead, I will try to show that it is by no means the only way of 
saving determinacy. 
6 See for example Lewis, D., “Putnam’s Paradox”, Australasian Journal of Phi-
losophy, 62 (1984), pp. 221–36, p. 222, and Hale, B. and Wright, C., “Put-
nam’s Model–theoretic Argument against Metaphysical Realism”, in Hale and 
Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, cit, pp. 427–57, 
p. 428. 
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incapacity of any formal theory to discriminate between iso-
morphic models. Finally, Putnam’s target is not directly the 
above sketched naturalistic line of thought, but more in gen-
eral the metaphysical realism (even though he focuses par-
ticularly the one that does not turn on supernatural powers of 
the human mind, like that of grasping platonic forms),7 
which he equates with the thesis that “the theory that is 
‘ideal’ from the point of view of operational utility, inner 
beauty and elegance, ‘plausibility’, simplicity, ‘conservati 
vism’, etc., might be false”.8 With his argument, he aims to 
show the “unintelligibility” (ibid., p. 126) of this thesis. In 
fact, if consistent, as it should be, the ideal theory will have a 
model, whose domain is the infinite set of objects in the 
world, namely an interpretation onto objects of the world that 
makes it true.9 Obviously, the metaphysical realist would 
react by pointing out that this interpretation might not be the 
intended one, and on the intended one the theory might still 
turn out to be false. But if we are not able to make sense of the 
notion of intended interpretation, as Putnam argues, the sup-
position that the theory might really be false “appears to col-
lapse into unintelligibility”: the truth in that model seems to 
be sufficient for the truth tout court.10 
However, in spite of these complications, the core of the 
argument is, in its structure, quite simple. As Putnam himself 
                                                 
7 See Putnam, Realism and Reason, cit., p.1. In his “Model Theory and the 
‘Factuality’ of Semantics” (in George, A. (ed.), Reflections on Chomsky, Ox-
ford, Blackwell, 1989, pp. 213–32), he wrote: “The upshot of this model–
theoretic argument is simply that semantic physicalism does not work. (How-
ever, physicalism seems to be the only sort of metaphysical realism that our 
time can take seriously.)”, p. 220. 
8 Putnam, Meaning and the Moral Sciences, cit., p. 125. 
9 Strictly speaking, that would require two independent arguments in order to 
show that the theory would have at least one infinite model and that there is 
an infinite number of objects in the world. If it was not so, in fact, nothing 
would guarantee that the theory has a model with the right cardinality. On 
this point, Putnam cheats: “If THE WORLD is finite, let the theory be compati-
ble with there being only N individuals (where N is the cardinality of THE 
WORLD)” (ibid., p. 139).  
10 Of course, that is valid just for ideal theories, because only in this case nothing 
could ever falsify them. 
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recognizes, what he is doing is just extending “in a very 
strong way”11 some Quinean results, by adding a few corol-
laries. After having proved that establishing the truth value of 
every sentence of a language is not sufficient to determine the 
reference of its subsentential expressions, and that establish-
ing their truth conditions (their truth value in any possible 
world) does not improve the situation, he disposes of some 
alleged ways of solving the puzzle, including the naturalist 
one, and concludes that we should look upon reference from 
a very different perspective, metaphysically innocuous, by 
achieving the so–called “internal realism”, according to 
which truth does not transcend our final criteria of justifica-
tion.12 
Let us suppose we have a first–order formalization of our 
language, and that “the operational and theoretical con-
straints (the ones rational inquirers would accept in some sort 
                                                 
11 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, cit., p. 33. 
12 Almost all philosophers who as far as I know have discussed the matter, with 
the partial exception of David L. Anderson (“What is the Model–theoretic Ar-
gument”, Journal of Philosophy, 90 (1993), pp. 311–22) that I will briefly 
consider later on, seem to me to agree in regarding what I am presenting as 
the core of the argument. Some, like Timothy Bays (“On Putnam and His 
Models”, Journal of Philosophy, 98 (2001), pp. 331–50), more interested in 
the mathematical aspects of the argument, favour the version that makes use 
of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, on which Putnam insists particularly in 
Realism and Reason, cit.. In any case, the difference is not substantial. I prefer 
to introduce here (following Hale and Wright, “Putnam’s Model–theoretic 
Argument against the Metaphysical Realism”, cit.) the version that makes use 
of permutations mainly for two reasons (for another one, see Hansen, C., 
“Putnam’s Indeterminacy Argument: the Skolemization of Absolutely Every-
thing”, Philosophical Studies, 51 (1987), pp. 77–99, pp. 82–7). Firstly, it has 
a more general range, since it is valid even if we assume that the domain of 
interpretation is in some way independently fixed, and it does not require a 
first–order formulation. Secondly, it has more disruptive effects as regards in-
determinacy of reference: every expression of the language, with the excep-
tion of the logical apparatus, is affected by it in an uncontrollable manner. On 
the contrary, the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, alone, on the one hand does 
not have consequences on the reference of singular terms, on the other does 
not bring about a complete inscrutability of the extension of the predicates. To 
conclude, Ernie Lepore and Barry Loewer, in their “A Putnam’s Progress” 
(Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12 (1988), pp. 459–73) offered a (sympa-
thetic) reconstruction of Putnam’s argument that focuses on the differences 
between metaphysical and internal realism. 
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of ideal limit of inquiry) determine which sentences in the 
language are true”.13 It seems that in this way we possess 
absolutely everything it makes sense to require. What else, 
apart from all the observational data available in principle 
and what in some way marks our being rational, could ever 
be relevant? In any case, we are faced with a particular first–
order theory. Hence, in spite of the ‘ideality’ of the theory, the 
language in which it is formulated, as any first–order lan-
guage, will be liable to an infinite number of different inter-
pretations. For example, it is easy to show that, given a lan-
guage and an interpretation of it, for any non identical per-
mutation of the domain (namely, for any one–to–one func-
tion that maps any element of it onto another), there exists 
another interpretation in the same domain that agrees with 
the first one for the truth value of the sentences but assigns a 
different reference to the primitive non logical expressions.14 
Let us suppose then that the language contains the proper 
name “Aristotle”, which appears in some sentences of our 
‘ideal theory’. According to the intended interpretation, all 
these sentences are about Aristotle, and attribute to him all 
the properties that he possesses, or rather that we are justified 
in attributing. Yet, if in the domain of the interpretation there 
is, as there has to be, Kant as well, then by properly adjusting 
the reference of other expressions we can interpret the same 
sentences as being about him without their truth values 
changing. What is more, we can interpret them as being 
                                                 
13 Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, cit., p. 33. 
14 For simple proof, see Hale and Wright, “Putnam’s Model–theoretic Argument 
against Metaphysical Realism”, cit., pp. 448–9. We can also prove something 
stronger, that is that, given a language and an interpretation of it, for any non 
identical permutation of the domain there exists another interpretation in the 
same domain that agrees with the first one for the truth conditions of the sen-
tences (functions from worlds to truth values) but assigns a different refer-
ence to the primitive non logical expressions (ibid., pp. 449–51). In any case, 
it is unclear to me how in Putnam’s perspective we could ever get these truth 
conditions, since observational and theoretical constraints do not seem to de-
termine them. To conclude, we should add that first–order formalization is 
not essential. Analogous results can be proved for second–order formaliza-
tions (ibid., p. 451) and for those in languages with modal operators (ibid., 
pp. 451–2). 
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about any other object in the domain, and anything seems to 
go: we are left with a total indeterminacy of reference. 
It could be noted that I have incidentally said that the in-
terpretation that assigns Aristotle, and not Kant, to “Aristotle”, 
is the intended one. Putnam’s crucial point, however, is about 
exactly that. Both interpretations, we have seen, make all the 
sentences of the ideal theory, and only them, true, that is to 
say they satisfy any possible operational and theoretical con-
straint. But if they are both compatible with all the evidence 
we might ever have, it seems that absolutely nothing, short of 
magical mental powers, allows us to single out one as being 
intended. Appealing to mental states and their intentionality, 
for example, does not help. If we conceive them as “pure”, 
that is individuated only by what goes on inside us (as sen-
tences of the mentalese, or mental images, or functional 
states, or neural configurations, or something else), they do 
not solve the problem (what in the world are they related 
to?). If we conceive them as “impure”, that is individuated by 
what they are about, they presuppose our ability to refer to 
objects and properties of the external world instead of ex-
plaining it.15 In short, nothing seems to allow us to state that 
“Aristotle”, in our speech, refers really to Aristotle rather than 
to Kant, or to any other individual. 
At this point, the naturalist comes into play and tries to 
make his move. Of course there is something that makes “Ar-
istotle” the name of Aristotle, he says. It is Aristotle, and not 
Kant or some thing else, that has the natural relation with 
“Aristotle” (let us call it “R”) to which he has reduced the 
semantic one – I remind you that we are assuming that he 
has in some way reached this. So, even if other interpretations 
of the theory are logically possible, the actual one is that 
                                                 
15 The Twin Earth case helps in making clear the distinction between pure and 
impure mental states (introduced by Putnam in Reason, Truth and History, 
cit., pp. 42–3): Oscar and his twin have the same pure mental states, but they 
differ with regard to some impure mental states (water–states). Another way 
of explaining the distinction is to draw a parallel with the case of language: 
syntactically individuated sentences are pure, interpreted sentences are im-
pure. 
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which associates every primitive of the language with the 
individual or the class of n–tuples of individuals with which it 
has the relation R. After all, a logical possibility is not a fact: it 
is true that we can in some way balance the books even asso-
ciating “Aristotle” with Kant, but, in fact, it is only Aristotle 
who the expression refers to. In so many words, it would not 
be the mind but nature that ‘selects’ the ‘right’ interpretation. 
According to Putnam, however, this move is not a good 
one. After all, what our naturalist is doing is just supplement-
ing our ideal theory by adding to it a formula like “x refers to 
y if and only if R(x, y)”, or something similar.16 What does he 
achieve in that way? Nothing more than another theory, 
which obviously will be affected by the same problems as the 
former one: it will have a plurality of models –even if perhaps 
not the same–, so the reference of its expressions will not 
come out more determined, in spite of the intentions of the 
naturalist. Ironically, to the same predicate “R” different in-
terpretations, coinciding in the truth values and truth condi-
tions that induce on the sentences of the theory, will assign 
different extensions. Insult added to injury…17 
Putnam’s moral is simple. We should give up the hope of 
finding a correspondence between words and objects from an 
external and objective point of view, and be content with the 
little that we can say about semantics within the theory: that 
                                                 
16 More correctly, he is telling us that the theory will contain the formula in 
question. 
17 The remark that what the naturalist is doing “is just adding more theory” 
(Putnam, Realism and Reason, cit., p. 18) is in some way present in all the 
three pieces of writings that I am discussing (compare with Meaning and the 
Moral Sciences, cit., pp. 126–7, and Truth, Reason and History, cit., pp. 45–
8). In the face of the many criticisms that have been moved against this strat-
egy of reasoning, Anderson (see Anderson, “What is the Model–theoretic Ar-
gument”, cit.) tried to maintain –without in fact being very convincing– that 
the argument should not be interpreted in that way. Beside the model–
theoretic part there should instead appear the specific criticisms that Putnam 
formulates in various places against some projects of naturalization, and in 
particular against those which appeal to the notion of cause. Even leaving 
aside the fact that philologically this interpretation does not work, this defence 
of the argument seems to me quite weak, because on the one hand the spe-
cific criticisms to those projects are slight and on the other they are unable to 
rule out the possibility that different ones have success. 
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“Aristotle” refers to Aristotle, “Kant” to Kant, and so on. 
Whatever they mean, these assertions are true, and that is 
sufficient.18 In short, semantical facts cannot have any deep 
explanation, and thankfully they do not need it. 
Theory and metatheory: what is wrong in the argument 
Unfortunately for Putnam, but fortunately for those that find 
his internal realism unintelligible, there is a very simple ob-
jection that we can make against the argument.19 As we have 
seen, the problem is raised beginning from some metatheo-
retical considerations, or, to be more explicit, from some 
model–theoretic results. Now, the crucial thing that we have 
to note is that there is no argument unless it is assumed that 
the interpretation of the metatheoretical language is deter-
mined. Only if the words that occur in the formulation of the 
Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, or in the one that we have pre-
sented, have the ‘intended’ interpretation, could the latter be 
used to deduce what Putnam deduces. It does not matter that, 
in the case of the ideal theory, the metatheory has to be part 
of the theory, and hence in no better condition. After all, Put-
nam, unlike Quine, does not mean to prove the indetermi-
nacy or inscrutability of reference tout court, but only to 
show that the metaphysical realist, and, in particular, our 
                                                 
18 The assertions are “analytic relative to the theory” (Putnam, Meaning and the 
Moral Sciences, cit., p. 136), because they follow “immediately from the defi-
nition of ‘refers’” (ibid.), where the definition is a mere list, in a Tarskian style.  
19 It is an objection in some way current, even though never quite explicitly, in 
literature. For example, it seems to me to be at the root of Michael Devitt’s 
criticisms (see Devitt, M., Realism and Truth, Second Edition, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 1991, pp. 225–9). Some recent eye–opening re-
marks by Bays (“On Putnam and his Models”, cit., pp. 347–50) go in the 
same direction. See also Loux, M.J., Metaphysics: a Contemporary Introduc-
tion, Second Edition, London, Routledge, 2002, pp. 281–3. In my opinion, the 
objection is clearer and stronger than the well known one that David Lewis 
formulated (Lewis, “Putnam Paradox”, cit., pp. 225–6), which is however re-
lated. Anthony L. Brueckner (“Putnam’s Model–theoretic Argument against 
Metaphysical Realism”, Analysis, 44 (1984), pp. 134–40), Mark Heller 
(“Putnam, Reference, and Realism”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 12 
(1988), pp. 113–27) and James Van Cleve (“Semantic Supervenience and 
Referential Indeterminacy”, Journal of Philosophy, 89 (1992), pp. 344–61) 
move more or less along the same lines as Lewis. 
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naturalist, cannot avoid it. Therefore, replying to Putnam as 
Aristotle replies to the skeptical that denies the principle of 
non contradiction, that is maintaining that he simply contra-
dicts himself (in denying, he would assume what he is deny-
ing) is missing the mark: he has the total right to assume the 
determinacy of his talking, and, particularly, of the metathe-
ory that he uses in his reasoning, in order to criticize people 
who are not able to account for this determinacy (of the the-
ory, but finally also of the metatheory). 
At this point, however, those who want to question Put-
nam’s conclusions have at their disposal, in my opinion, a 
winning move, which consists of questioning his metatheory: 
why that one exactly? 
Obviously, we are not to deny the truth of the metatheo-
rems that Putnam uses. But why should we assume that the 
metatheory is exhausted by them? In particular, why could 
we not see the move of the naturalist we considered in the 
previous section as a move at this level, namely as the pro-
posal of supplementing the metatheory with the formula “x 
refers to y if and only if R(x, y)”, or something similar? If we 
maintain that what our naturalist is doing “is just adding 
more theory”, we not only misunderstand, but also cheat 
him.20 After all, the formula contains a variable that ranges 
over expressions of the language and a predicate as “refer-
ring to”: it therefore seems to be an assertion about the the-
ory, and not an assertion of the theory. If so, it should have 
the same status as the metatheorems that Putnam uses in his 
reasoning. Hence, as in these, the expressions that occur in it 
(“R”, in particular) would have, contrary to what Putnam 
claims, a determined reference. Since we are assuming that 
the formula is true (see first section), which he never ques-
tions, the reference of the expressions of the object language 
                                                 
20 As Bays write, “Putnam wants to limit his opponents to working within a 
particular theory, while he himself steps outside this theory to talk about its 
semantics. […] Putnam’s arguments depend on allowing himself just a little 
more than he allows those against whom he is arguing” (Bays, “On Putnam 
and His Models”, cit., p. 350). 
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would turn out to be equally determined: they would pre-
cisely stand for whatever bears the relation R to them. 
In the end, we just have to choose between two different 
metatheoretical proposals: Putnam’s and the naturalist’s. The 
latter includes the important theorems of the first, thus rec-
ognizing that there are many (infinite, if the domain is infi-
nite) interpretations of the expressions of a language which 
are logically possible, but supplements them with another 
simple assertion which allows us to pick up, from these inter-
pretations, the ‘intended’ one.21 We are in no position to es-
tablish now which of these two proposals is right, also be-
cause, as I have written in the opening section, the naturalist’s 
in fact still does not exist. Yet certainly Putnam with his ar-
gument does not help one against the other, because, as we 
have just seen, he moves precisely from the assumption of the 
first, and he claims, without any justification, that the second 
cannot be assumed in the same way: that is, he is simply as-
suming what he should prove. 
Besides these, could there be other metatheoretical pro-
posals? For sure, for example, the classical metatheory could 
be supplemented with an assertion more or less of this type: 
“x refers to y if and only if y is conventionally associated with 
x”, with the necessary specifications. In fact, even this easy 
integration would allow us to save determinacy of reference, 
though it could not be appreciated by naturalists because of 
its use of the intentional notion of convention. During a 
seminar on this topic, another option was suggested to me, 
that of simply fixing in the metalanguage the interpretation 
of the language of the theory. In my opinion, however, this is 
misunderstanding the problem: Putnam’s point is not that we 
cannot ever single out an interpretation, but rather that we 
cannot ever establish whether this is the right, intended, one. 
Suppose for example you and I observe some people speak-
                                                 
21 Moreover, the opportunity of a similar integration is suggested also from 
partly different perspectives. For example, model–theoretic semantics, ac-
cording to Diego Marconi, is not able to account for our lexical competence 
(see Marconi, D., Lexical Competence, Boston, MIT Press, 1997, ch. 1). 
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ing. If we possessed all the data we needed, we could offer an 
interpretation of their talk. Yet, unfortunately, our interpreta-
tions could differ in the way we have sketched above. The 
crucial questions are: Who is right, you or I? By using the 
name “Aristotle”, are they speaking about Aristotle or Kant? 
What is more, is there a fact of the matter in this case? Put-
nam denies it, whereas the naturalist’s and conventionalist’s 
proposals appeal respectively to natural and to social facts in 
order to solve the puzzle. Instead, the ‘simple metalinguistic’ 
proposal saves determinacy in a completely vacuous manner: 
it is true that I can ‘rightly’ determine, from my own perspec-
tive, the reference of the words people are uttering, yet you 
can ‘rightly’ determine it in a different way from yours. Even 
worse, when you and I talk to each other perhaps we are 
using the same words with a different reference. So, the inde-
terminacy reappears at a deeper level. In the end, the pro-
posal turns out to be almost equivalent to Putnam’s rather 
than a real alternative. 
A final remark. It has been pointed out to me that Putnam 
could reply by noting that natural relations (like R) do not 
have a metatheoretical nature and this would make a great 
difference between his proposals and the naturalist’s. I find 
this objection wrong. The point is that no notion is metatheo-
retical by essence, and thus those used in the classical 
metatheory (e.g. reference and truth) are in a no better posi-
tion than R. In our theories about the world we can speak of 
reference and truth, for example in studying other languages. 
Only when we investigate our own language do we have in 
some way to step outside it in order to talk about its seman-
tics. It is this investigation, and not the notions that we use in 
doing it, that is metatheoretical. Thus, if our language belongs 
to the natural order, as naturalists believe, the notions which 
we use in investigating the natural world are the notions 
which we should use in investigating the language, namely in 
doing metatheory. If we deny this we assume, once again, 
what should be proved. 
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What world? 
If I am right, Putnam’s argument does not work. People who 
are sympathetic to the perspective of internal realism could 
however keep on appealing to the model–theoretic theorems 
in order to safeguard the apparently reliable intuition that, 
given a formal theory, there is an infinite number of ways of 
‘connecting’ it to, or of ‘projecting’ it onto, the world. I wish 
to conclude this article by saying something about why in my 
opinion we should resist this intuition. 
Is it true that given a theory there is an infinite number of 
ways of ‘connecting’ it to, or of ‘projecting’ it onto, the world, 
obviously leaving aside the fact that if our naturalist is right, 
there would be only one way in which the theory is actually 
connected to it? Yes and no, I am tempted to answer. Yes, if 
we conceive the ‘connecting’ as the interpreting in a domain 
that contains all the individuals that there are in the world 
and this domain is infinite: the metatheorems show clearly 
that we can do it in an infinite number of ways. No, if we take 
the notion of world a bit more seriously. 
What do I mean, exactly, by that? Simply, that the world 
is not a sheer set of individuals. On the contrary, within it 
there are individuals with properties and in relations with 
each other (“The world is the totality of facts, not of things”, 
Wittgenstein wrote in the Tractatus). In order to meet the 
requirements of formal semantics, one can reformulate this 
by saying that in the world there are individuals which be-
long to classes that are subsets of the domain, and which are 
members of n–tuples of individuals that belong to subsets of 
the nth Cartesian product of the domain with itself. Yet, it is 
important to always remember that the notion of class is in-
troduced to this end, and is dependent in that use on those of 
property and of relation (for any property or relation there is 
a corresponding class), and not viceversa.22 
                                                 
22 If you think there are paradoxical properties or relations, you can reformu-
late: for any non paradoxical property or relation there is a corresponding 
class. 
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Now, the point is that the interpretations we can con-
struct from permutations do assign ‘strange’ classes to the 
predicates. ‘Strange’, obviously, not from a set–theoretic point 
of view (every subset of the domain is legitimate), but from 
the point of view of the conception of world that the use of 
set–theoretic notions within semantics claims to capture. A 
class which contains only male dogs and female cats, for ex-
ample, is ‘strange’. We can certainly isolate it, but perhaps 
only because we have in our language primitive predicates 
that stand for more ‘natural’ properties and relations, what-
ever they are. There is no reason, I think, for admitting 
strange properties and relations in our ontology. Thus, there 
is not a corresponding property or relation for any class. And, 
to come back to our subject, if we maintain that the world is 
constituted by individuals with ‘natural’ properties, and in 
‘natural’ relations with each other, an interpretation that 
connects our ideal theory to the world will consequently be 
an interpretation that maps as far as possible its primitive 
predicates onto classes that correspond to these natural prop-
erties and relations.23 Nothing, contrary to the alleged intui-
tion from which we started, leads us to believe that there is an 
infinite number of these interpretations, or even more than 
one. 
Obviously, a lot remains to be clarified. What is, for ex-
ample, a ‘natural’ property? Putnam, who briefly takes this 
possibility into consideration, accuses it of “medieval essen-
tialism” (ibid., p. xii), and of being tied up with a completely 
discredited psychology, according to which we would be 
equipped with a mysterious capacity to grasp platonic 
forms.24 The latter charge seems to me to be groundless: the 
                                                 
23 Lewis seems to be more or less of this opinion (see Lewis, “Putnam Paradox”, 
cit., pp. 227–30). However, we have to note that we cannot use these meta-
physical considerations against Putnam’s argument, because they presuppose 
the solution (see Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, cit., pp. 35–8). 
24 Carsten Hansen (“Putnam’s Indeterminacy Argument...”, cit.) criticized Put-
nam’s argument against metaphysical realism because it would rest on the 
very strong epistemological claim that “we have access only to our own rep-
resentations” (p. 92). In my opinion the premise which Putnam appeals to is 
weaker and less disputable, that is that we don’t have any direct access to non 
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belief in the existence of natural properties does not involve 
the belief in the existence of a mental power of immediately 
and precisely determining the boundaries of the correspond-
ing classes. On the contrary, we can see in scientific activity 
exactly that whose purpose is to individuate them by trial and 
error. After all, now we know: whales are not fish. Perhaps, 
we could even overturn the criticism on Putnam. By assum-
ing the existence of a property for any class, no matter how 
‘strange’ the latter is, we would make science itself an under-
standable practice. However, I do not wish to discuss this 
point. My limited goal here was to show the fallacy of Put-
nam’s argument and investigate the intuition that is at its 
basis. I hope I have succeeded. 
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individual entities (properties or relations). Obviously, by denying it one could 
save metaphysical realism from indeterminacy. However, I think that the 
metaphysical realists can accept Putnam’s epistemological premise without 
any serious risk. 
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